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6Confucian Virtue Jurisprudence
LINGHAO WANG AND LAWRENCE B SOLUM
I. INTRODUCTION
THIS ESSAY SKETCHES a position in general jurisprudence that is distinctive in two ways. First, it is rooted in the traditions of Confucian (or Ruist,儒家) thought. Second, the view of law offered in the theory is 
aretaic (virtue centred). We have dubbed our theory, Confucian virtue jurisprudence, 
with the understanding that our version of a contemporary aretaic theory of law 
with roots in Confucian thought is not the only possible member of a family of 
theories that could accurately bear that name.1 More broadly, Confucian virtue 
jurisprudence is a member of a larger family of aretaic legal theories, including 
Neo-Aristotelian versions of virtue jurisprudence.2
The tradition of Confucian thought centres on the writings of an historical fig-
ure, Confucius (Kongzi, Master Kong, or 孔子). Our focus will be on ancient 
thought, with an emphasis on Confucius’ Analects supplemented by the views of 
other thinkers in the Confucian tradition. At various points, we will be concerned 
with issues of translation, but our main purpose is to develop a contemporary 
theory of law that builds on ancient foundations.
What are the elements of a general jurisprudence? Legal theorists generally 
take two positions in searching for answers to this meta-theoretical question. One 
group believes that legal theory should investigate normative questions and that 
the fundamental purpose of legal theory is to support prescriptive legal scholar-
ship. A second group claims that the primary aim is description. Some members 
of this second group believe that this involves analysis of the concept of ‘law’; oth-
ers would describe the project as the development of a theoretical account of the 
essential or necessary features of law or legal institutions. From a Confucian per-
spective, however, the fundamental question in legal theory is the aim and proper 
1 The most sophisticated interpretation (or reconstruction) of  the classical Confucian texts from a 
modern jurisprudential perspective can be found in Chang (1990: chs 2, 6 and 7). Our work is inspired 
and influenced by his excellent scholarship on Confucian jurisprudence. 
2 See Farrelly and Solum (2007).
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function of law.3 In this short essay, we sketch some of the central elements of 
Confucian virtue jurisprudence. We begin with an overview of Confucian 
thought.
II. AN INTRODUCTION TO CONFUCIAN SOCIAL AND
ETHICAL THOUGHT
Just as Neo-Aristotelian virtue jurisprudence is developed from Aristotelian virtue 
ethics,4 Confucian virtue jurisprudence draws on Confucian thought.
A. The Basic Structure of Confucian Moral Theory
In Confucius’ time, China’s feudal system was in its final stage of collapse, causing 
social chaos and disorder. The old social system was fading and the new one had 
not yet been established, so it ‘was up to the thinkers of the first millennium BC to 
come up with answers, solve the puzzle and restore peace.’5 Confucianism is one 
of the schools of thought that undertook this task.
There are three main figures in early Confucianism. The first, Confucius, lived 
between 551 and 479 BC. Confucius’ words and deeds are recorded in the 
Analects, a book edited by later disciples. The second figure is the ‘second sage’, 
Mencius (372–289 BC), who is famous for his positive (or optimistic) view of 
human nature. His moral theory has an inward-out character; he believed that 
self-cultivation is sufficient to lead a moral life and thus his theory focuses on the 
virtues. Unlike Mencius, the third thinker, Xunzi (479–221 BC), has views that 
could be called outward-in; he claimed that biological needs and desires are cen-
tral to human nature. Xunzi believed that external habituation and deliberative 
correction are the only ways to rectify man’s selfish nature. There are differences 
among the three main thinkers in early Confucianism, but we will pass them over 
and attempt to interpret their texts so as to reconstruct a consistent and plausible 
theory.
Confucian theory provides an overall account of both conduct rules and char-
acter traits. The conduct rules are Li, normally translated as rules of propriety or rit-
ual, which refers to ceremonial rituals, proper manners in social interactions, 
conventional customs and even civil law (in the modern sense). The most impor-
tant character traits are Ren and Yi, fundamental virtues in Confucian ethical 
theory. Ren (translated as humanity in the broad sense) is the cardinal virtue that 
unifies the particular moral excellences; Ren also has a narrow sense (translated as 
benevolence) that identifies a particular virtue related to the affective capacity con-
3 The move beyond the necessary or essential features of  law is in sympathy with a view expressed by 
Frederick Schauer (2010).
4 Solum (2006: 75–76). 
5 Chang (1990: 20).
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cerning caring for others. The virtue of Yi, translated as rightness or appropriateness, 
is a character trait related to the motivational attitude to abide by Li (social 
norms). 
On the Confucian account of the relationship between rules and virtues, rule-
following actions should be properly motivated in order to achieve a harmonious 
society – a well-ordered flourishing society governed by virtuous political leaders 
with limited use of coercion or punishment. Ideally, both citizens and rulers pos-
sess the virtues of Ren and Yi, enabling them to act according to Li for the right 
reasons and with the proper emotions.
Many scholars have argued that Confucian moral theory can be seen as a 
Chinese version of virtue ethics. For other scholars, however, the deontological 
notion of Li has been seen as the core ideal in Confucian moral theory: Confucian 
Ritualism is the theory articulated by some historians to emphasise the significant 
importance of Li in traditional Confucian society of China.6
We will interpret Confucian thought as a particular version of virtue ethics in 
the sense specified by Michael Slote; a virtue ethics that (1) takes aretaic notions 
rather than deontological notions as primary and (2) emphasises moral evaluation 
of agents and their motives and character traits.7 Early Confucian ethical thought 
is a virtue ethics in Slote’s sense.8
The aretaic character of Confucian thought is consistent with the role played 
by Li (or social norms that provide comprehensive governance of social life). 
Confucian thought posits that ideal moral agents (in the conditions of traditional 
Chinese society) should strictly observe Li. In the Analects, we read, ‘Do not look 
unless it is in accordance with Li; do not listen unless it is in accordance with Li; do 
not speak unless it is in accordance with Li; do not move unless it is in accordance 
with Li’.9
So on the one hand, we have a deontological notion Li, which functions as a set 
of external rules specifying right action. But on the other hand, we have Ren and 
Yi, which are virtues or character traits. Ren is more fundamental than Li; as 
Confucius once said, ‘A man who is not Ren – what has he to do with Li?’10 The 
virtue of Yi is related to the proper motivational attitudes of abiding by Li. In 
another place in the Analects, Confucius stated that Li is the form and Yi is the 
essence in virtuous agents’ moral lives.11 So, virtues are more fundamental than 
rules12 and moral evaluation of agents’ characters is primary.
6 See Chow (1994).
7 See Slote (1992: 89).
8 Wai-Ying Wong has an excellent discussion of  the distinctive features of  virtue ethics and its rela-
tionship to Confucian moral theory. See Wong (2001: 286–89). A lot of  important works in Chinese 
philosophy have been devoted to an aretaic reading of  Confucian ethics. See eg Gier (2001: 280–305); 
Slingerland (2001: 97–125); van Norden (2007); and Yu (1998: 323–47). 
9 Confucius (2001: 32), with some modifications to the translation.
10 ibid 7, with some modifications to the translation.
11 ibid 41.
12 By claiming ‘more fundamental’, we are not arguing that Li loses its independent value or that Li 
can be deduced from virtues.
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Confucian ethics incorporates both aretaic notions and deontological notions, 
postulating a harmonious unity of the external rules and internal virtues. The 
deontic and aretaic elements are unified by the social roles of agents; those roles 
govern relationships between members of the community. The same agent might 
occupy different roles in connection with different relationships. For example, a 
woman might be a mother with regard to the relationship between her and her 
children and simultaneously a disciple with regard to the relationship between her 
and her teacher.
Thus, we can summarise as follows: Li prescribes rules attached to roles. Ren is 
the cardinal virtue of humanity and the particular virtue of benevolence. Yi can 
be seen as an intermediate between the deontological notion Li and aretaic notion 
Ren by specifying the motivational attitude appropriate to the fulfilment of respon-
sibilities and duties attached to social roles. Thus, Confucian moral thought is a 
role-based virtue ethics. It is role-based because ‘it is based on the roles that make 
an agent the person he or she is’;13 it is a virtue ethics because the ultimate con-
cern of early Confucian thinkers was the inner characters of moral agents. The 
diagram below roughly shows the structure of Confucian ethics:
Li (Social norms) Role

Yi (Properly motivated to fulfill the responsibilities and duties set by Li)

Ren (Fundamental virtue)
Agents who possesses all the virtues are Junzi (君子), commonly translated as gen-
tleman or superior man in English. A Junzi possesses all the virtues, and thus he or she 
is able to autonomously abide by the external rules specified by Li in accord with 
his or her own dispositions. Someone who is a Junzi and lives under favourable 
conditions could be said to live a flourishing life. We might call this view of human 
flourishing the harmony conception of human flourishing. The life of a Junzi is harmoni-
ous because in such a life the aims or values of the individual are consistent with 
the social norms of the community in which the agent lives.
With the overview complete, we now provide a fuller description of the funda-
mental concepts in Confucian ethical and social thought; these concepts are the 
building blocks of the Confucian virtue jurisprudence we sketch in the next part.
13 Nuyen (2009).
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B. Four Concepts: Li, Correcting Names, Yi, and Ren
i. Li
There was no word precisely corresponding to positive law in ancient China. 
Nonetheless, there were traditional norms governing human conduct and 
coordin ating social interactions; these norms formed the normative domain called 
Li (禮) – a crucial ideal in Confucian practical philosophy. However, since this 
Chinese word has undergone a long history of linguistic evolution, the meaning 
and scope of Li has changed over time. The conventional view is that Li origi-
nated from the practice of sacrifice; Li was constituted by the rules specifying ritu-
als governing sacrifices performed by individuals or groups in honour of their 
common ancestors.14 Later, the scope of Li was extended to include etiquette and 
proper manners in social interaction. Our view is that the scope of Li in the 
Confucian context refers to the whole normative system in the society, including 
the rituals and rites in the sacrifice ceremony, etiquette, moral rules and political 
institutions, and even some rules we would not call laws.15
But our conception of Li is not an idea limited to a purely external standard of 
conduct. Confucius made this point explicit in his comparison between governing 
people by government regulations backed by punishments and guiding people by 
virtues and Li:
The Master said, ‘If the people be led by governmental regulations, and uniformity 
sought to be given them by punishments, they will try to avoid the punishment, but 
have no sense of shame. If they be led by virtue, and uniformity sought to be given them 
by Li, they will have the sense of shame, and moreover will reform themselves.’16
From this comparison, we know that Li has an internal aspect and is necessarily 
connected with the emotion of shame and the virtue of Yi.17
Why was Li necessary for social order? Confucian philosophers answered this 
question by developing several functional arguments. For Xunzi, the primary func-
tion of Li is the coordination of social interactions and the creation of social order: 
we call this the social coordinative function. Xunzi claims that human beings have natu-
ral desires while the good is insufficient for the fulfilment of people’s desires. If these 
desires are left unregulated, ‘there will be chaos’ and people ‘will be impoverished’.18 
Li can provide a proper common ground for social interactions and overcome the 
problem of chaos produced by unregulated natural desires. Moreover, by regulat-
ing resource distribution, Li can produce prosperity.19
14 Chang (1983: 37).
15 It was common in the history of  Imperial China for Li to be codified and enacted by political 
authority.
16 Confucius (1971: 146), with some modifications to the translation. 
17 The relationship between the emotion of  shame and Li will be discussed more thoroughly in our 
investigation of  the virtue Yi.
18 Xunzi (2001: 265).
19 ibid.
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In Confucian role-based virtue ethics, Li provides information about social 
rules to which moral responsibilities are attached. These ethical roles are closely 
connected with five crucial ethical relationships (君子), which are (1) that between 
parents and children; (2) that between ruler and subject; (3) that between husband 
and wife; (4) that between elder and younger brother; and (5) that between 
friends.20 Li can be described as a sort of social grammar, which ‘provides each 
member with a defined place and status within the family, community, and 
polity’.21
Li also has an expressive function; it enables the expression of sentiments and 
dispositions. There are two typical ways in which Li performs this expressive func-
tion: first, the rules of Li set up uniform standards in circumstances and regulate 
the agents’ feeling of certain emotions; and, second, the rules of Li provide agents 
a proper way to successfully express their emotions.22
Since Confucian theory is a role-based virtue ethics, ‘a moral agent must aim 
not only at the cultivation of right feelings, but also at the right expression of these 
feelings in proper context’.23 For Confucius, Li has a fundamental role in the prac-
tice of some virtues.24 Li sets standards for the proper manner and right feeling of 
emotions in particular contexts of social interactions. As Confucius put it, without 
agents’ observance of Li, some virtues will become vices.
Finally, Li has a constitutive role for human beings as social creatures. This 
theme can be seen as a further development of the coordinative function and the 
expressive function. Li incorporates rules of propriety, rituals, customs and law. 
From the social perspective, Li’s coordinative function establishes the foundation 
of social life. From the personal perspective, the expressive function of Li provides 
agents with a means and standard for the expression of their interior dispositions. 
Thus, we say that Li has a constitutive role. Li is like ‘the cement of the entire 
normative sociopolitical order’, 25 which binds ‘human beings and the spirits 
together in networks of interacting roles within the family, within the human soci-
ety, and with the numinous realms beyond.’26
ii. Correcting Names
The next idea that we examine is the doctrine of correcting names and the associated 
concept of name (名). Confucian philosophers developed an account of the use of 
names (ie characters in writing and by words and phrases in speech) in moral lan-
guage and recommended a doctrine of correcting names (正名) as the principle 
20 Mengzi (2001: 127). 
21 Ames and Rosemont (1988: 51). 
22 See Li Ji: Tan Gong (《礼记·檀弓》). Also see Chang (1990: 12).
23 Cua (1971: 134).
24 eg he claims that ‘[r]espectfulness, without Li, becomes laborious bustle; prudence, without Li, 
becomes timidity; courage, without Li, becomes insubordination; straightforwardness, without Li, 
becomes rudeness.’ Confucius (1971: 162), with some modifications to the translation. 
25 Schwartz (1985: 67). 
26 ibid.
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for the proper use of moral language. In this part of the essay, we interpret names 
as thick ethical concepts; this account of names is then used to illuminate the nature of 
the practice of correcting names.
The phrase correcting names appears only once in the Analects.27 For Confucius, 
the correction of names is crucial to the establishment of a stable social order. 
Confucius offered a chain of arguments, within which the notion of correcting 
names operates as the most fundamental premise. 
If names be not correct, language is not in accordance with actuality. If language be not 
in accordance with actuality, affairs cannot be carried on to success. When affairs can-
not be carried on to success, Li and music will not flourish. When Li and music do not 
flourish, punishments will miss the mark. When punishments miss the mark, the people 
do not know how to move hand or foot. Therefore a superior man considers it neces-
sary that the names he uses may be spoken appropriately and also that what he speaks 
may be carried out appropriately.28
In other words, this passage suggests that Confucius viewed the proper use of 
names as a precondition of social practice that functions well.
Ethical names have two functions: one is descriptive and the other is prescrip-
tive. On the one hand, names have a descriptive function that enables us to make 
reference to different things or describe different properties of things in the world. 
In this regard, correcting names ‘constructs a model of the proper function of 
language on the basis of the claim that the role of “names” (generally, substance 
words) is to distinguish differences in “realities”.’29 With the use of names, we can 
understand one another’s beliefs about the world and communicate with each 
other. For example, the names of lord, minister, father and son refer to different peo-
ple who possess these social roles.
On the other hand, names have a prescriptive function that is deeply connected 
with the traditional norms of Li. For example, the meaning of lord should be 
understood in its connection to the virtues, duties and proper ways of behaviour 
of a morally ideal lord. In ancient China, someone who properly understood the 
name of lord would have applied lord to express their normative expectations of the 
men who were actually in charge of political affairs. 
Understood literally, the process of correcting names seems to be the re- 
establishment of the proper correspondence between names and the actual state 
of ethical practice. However, this understanding does not specify the object of 
correction, which could be either ethical practice or linguistic practice. From the 
descriptive perspective, the actuality of ethical practice is prior to the description, 
thus the object of correction (in the practice of correcting names) is current usage 
of the relevant names.30 But from the prescriptive perspective, names imply the 
standards of actions, thus the objects of correction should be the actual states of 
affairs or actions that are connected with the prescriptive content of the names.
27 Confucius (1971: 263–64).
28 ibid, with some modifications to the translation.
29 Eno (1990: 146). 
30 Fung (1952: 60). 
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So what is the nature of the Confucian idea of ‘names’? Descriptive, prescrip-
tive, or both? Bernard Williams’ account of what he called ‘thick ethical concepts’ 
gives us a clearer picture of the descriptive and prescriptive features of names as 
well as the relationship between these two features.
The notion of thick ethical terms was introduced by Williams in his influential 
work Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, where he famously distinguished thick ethi-
cal concepts from thin ones. Thick ethical concepts include words like brutality or 
courage, which carry more factual or descriptive content than thin ethical concepts 
like right or wrong. Thin ethical concepts do not contain substantive information 
about states of affairs: from an assertion that a situation is good or an action is 
right, we can infer very little about the nature of the situation or action. But thick 
ethical concepts are different. For example, if an action is described as courageous, 
then we know that the agent faced the danger in an appropriate way.
Because thick ethical concepts are world-guided, they can facilitate moral con-
vergence among the members of a particular community and serve as the basis 
for social coordination. By way of contrast, thin concepts (like right or good) lack 
this close connection to facts about the world, and for this reason, thin concepts 
cannot facilitate agreement by providing a basis for agreement in judgements 
about particular cases.
We can characterise thick and thin ethical concepts as follows. Thin ethical 
concepts are concepts that only have general and abstract evaluative or prescrip-
tive content. Thick ethical concepts are ethical concepts that have both descrip-
tive content and prescriptive content. For Williams, thick ethical concepts may 
have another crucial feature; they imply ‘a union of fact and value’: ‘The way 
these notions are applied is determined by what the world is like (for instance, by 
how someone has behaved), and yet, at the same time, their application usually 
involves a certain valuation of the situation, of persons or actions.’31 Thus, thick 
ethical terms are both ‘world-guided’ and ‘action-guiding’ at the same time.
Thick ethical concepts are world-guided because the application of a thick eth-
ical term is guided by facts about the world. These concepts are also action-guid-
ing, in the sense that thick ethical concepts provide standards that give reasons for 
action and can be used to evaluate actions.32 For example, if someone describes 
an action as ‘cruel’, she has a reason not to do that action: the cruelty of the action 
provides her with a reason to refrain from engaging in the action. 
The third feature, and also the most important one, is what we call the amalgam 
nature of thick concepts. A thick concept represents an indissolubly united amal-
gam of description and evaluation.33 This amalgam nature has two dimensions, 
which we theorise as nondetachability and underdeterminacy.
On the one hand, thick concepts convey an evaluative attitude directed at a 
specific feature of a person, action or circumstance. Or, we might say that the 
31 Williams (2006: 129). 
32 ibid 140.
33 See Payne (2005: 96). 
Linghao Wang and Lawrence B Solum 113
evaluative attitude is expressed in the light of the description.34 When we say that an 
action is cruel, we are not making an all-things-considered assessment of that 
action but an assessment of a specific descriptive property of that action. This 
feature of thick concepts could be conceptualised as the Nondetachability Thesis.35 
The evaluative content of a thick concept is always the evaluation of one or more 
descriptive elements of that concept that cannot be fully detached from the con-
cept’s descriptive content.
On the other hand, users of thick concepts specify descriptive content from an 
evaluative point of view that is constructed by shared human needs, interests and 
concerns.36 For example, the evaluative point in the application of rudeness might 
be constructed by a particular concern of politeness or good manners in social 
interaction; so the thick concept rudeness might cover a wide range of actions.37 To 
apply thick concepts correctly, people always need to resort to the evaluative 
point underneath the concept. This aspect of thick concepts is described by the 
Underdeterminacy Thesis:38 the descriptive content of a concept alone cannot ade-
quately determine the application of that concept. The implication of the 
Underdeterminacy Thesis is that a thick concept may lack a natural shape,39 a shape 
that is defined solely by its descriptive elements. Instead, such concepts have a 
normative shape or evaluative shape that is organised by their evaluative point.
William’s notion of thick ethical concepts and the amalgam account of their 
nature help to provide a much clearer understanding of the Confucian idea of 
names and the related practice of correcting names. In the traditional under-
standing of Chinese scholars, there is some tension between the descriptive and 
the prescriptive view of names. Williams’ notion captures the nature of Confucian 
names and provides us with a new perspective on the superficial tension between 
the descriptive function and prescriptive function.
Confucian names, qua thick ethical concepts, are indissolubly united ethical con-
cepts combining descriptive and prescriptive elements. They can both serve the 
function of categories distinguishing like from unlike and have ethical implications 
indicating what is particularly right and morally wrong. The use of names of this 
sort can be improper for either one of two reasons: (1) inability to track the world 
or (2) inability to provide appropriate guidance for actions. If we understand the 
doctrine of correcting names in this way, then the objects of correction turn out to 
be the mistaken application of names to actions or persons. Whether to change the 
name to capture the genuine features of the world – as Mencius did when he recti-
fied the name of lord – or to reveal the true moral implications of existing names – 
as Confucius did when he emphasised the importance of fulfilment of duties 
connected to social roles – depends on the particular circumstances. Improper use 
34 See Blackburn (1992: 289). 
35 A more complete account is provided in Wang (2010).
36 See Feldman (1994: 1195, 1196). 
37 See Goldie (2008: 97). 
38 See Wang (2010).
39 For discussions of  the naturally shapeless nature of  thick concepts, see Dancy (1996: 263). 
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of a thick ethical concept can prompt either one of two responses: we can change 
the way we talk (apply the correct name) or we can change the way we act (act in 
accord with the correct name).
Since names are concepts with rich ethical meaning, they provide ethical guid-
ance for actions. Confucian philosophers’ ultimate goal in emphasising the cor-
rection of names is to give people ethical guidance through the application of 
names in the correct way and to the correct persons and actions. For example, the 
spontaneous application of the name regicide by an agent provides a reason not to 
kill.40 Similarly, the application of the word cruel to a type of punishment gives us 
a reason not to use that kind of punishment.
iii. Yi
Yi is normally translated as rightness, righteousness, appropriateness, or dutifulness. Since 
Yi functions as an intermediary between Ren and Li, that is, between an aretaic 
notion and a deontological notion, there might be some confusion about the 
nature of Yi. In the Analects, Yi refers to the quality of actions41 and thus it might be 
understood as a deontological term. But Yi sometimes refers to the attribute of 
persons42 and thus it might be understood as an aretaic concept.
The key to answering the question of whether Yi is aretaic or deontological lies 
in the relationship between Yi and Li. Another paragraph in the Analects sheds 
some light on this relationship:
The Master said, ‘The Junzi takes Yi as essential. He performs it according to Li, gives it 
expression through modesty, and perfects it with sincerity. This is indeed a Junzi.’43
This remark implies that Li cannot be reduced to external rightness. To perform 
the right action in the particular circumstances, one must have the right feelings 
and express these feelings rightly.44 This is why Confucius asked, ‘A man who is 
not Ren – what has he to do with Li?’45 Since Ren is a fundamental virtue – with 
content that is too abstract to connect directly with Li – Yi can be conceived as a 
virtue that mediates between Ren and Li. On this account, Yi harmonises external 
rightness (Li) with internal rightness (Ren).
Because Yi mainly deals with the social norms that constitute Li,46 Yi can be 
seen as a virtue concerning the motivational attitudes of actors who observe these 
social norms. A person possessing Yi is motivated in the right way to fulfil the 
responsibilities and duties of Li. Confucius did not elaborate on what exactly the 
appropriate motivation is, but he ruled out the motivations based on personal 
40 Of  course, the reason might not be an exclusive or decisive one, as Williams pointed out. See 
Williams (2006: 140). In other words, these reasons are defensible.
41 See Shun (1997: 25). 
42 See ibid 26.
43 Confucius (1971: 299), with some modifications to the translation. 
44 See Cua (1971: 134).
45 Confucius (2001: 7).
46 See Cua (2007: 134).
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gain.47 This distinction between Yi and profit is one of the central theses in the 
Confucian tradition of ethical and political thought.48
Yi is connected with the emotions of shame (羞) and aversion (惡). Mencius 
famously claimed that ‘the heart of shame and aversion is Yi.’49 As Mencius 
explains, the core of shame involves a negative emotion triggered by failure to 
conform to Li. 50 In the western tradition, we can distinguish conventional shame 
from ethical shame. Conventional shame ‘is a sort of unpleasant feeling we have 
when we believe those whose views matter to us look down on us (or on those with 
whom we identify) on the basis of a standard of appearance we share’.51 Ethical 
shame ‘is a sort of unpleasant feeling we have when we believe that we (or those 
with whom we identify) have significant character flaws.’52
What kind of shame was the concern of early Confucianists? On the one hand, 
they emphasised the importance of self-cultivation, so ethical shame would be of 
the right kind. This view is supported by Mencius’ recognition that the sense of 
shame is a crucial element in ethical self-cultivation.53 On the other hand, Li has 
an independent and irreducible role in the whole theoretical structure, and con-
ventional shame will support agents in their attempts to abide by social norms. 
When Confucius emphasised the crucial role of the sense of shame in the political 
contexts,54 his views seem to involve conventional shame as the mechanism that 
creates social pressure and thus maintains the social order. 
We conclude that the emotions connected to Yi include both conventional 
shame and ethical shame. Both forms of shame motivate agents to act according 
to the rules in Li. From another perspective, we might say that Li is internalised by 
agents with the help of Yi. Li provides the concrete, formal way of the expression 
of Ren (in the general sense) and Yi sets the appropriate internal attitudes and 
emotions in the process of expression. Yi provides harmony between external 
standards and internal virtues.
iv. Ren
Now we come to the most fundamental virtue, Ren, which has both a broad and a 
narrow sense.55 Ren in the narrow sense is translated as benevolence, which is con-
nected with the natural affective capacity of humans; in this context, benevolence 
means caring for or loving others. The broad sense of Ren is more ambiguous; it is 
47 The Master said, ‘The Junzi understands what is Yi, the petty person understands what is profit.’ 
Confucius (2001: 11).
48 See eg Mengzi (2001: 113).
49 Mengzi (2001: 143), with some modifications to the translation. 
50 See Shun (1997: 58). See also van Norden (2007: 262).
51 van Norden (2007: 259).
52 ibid 260.
53 Mencius said, ‘A sense of  dishonor is indeed important for people. Those who are crafty in their 
contrivances and schemes have no use for dishonor. If  one is not ashamed of  not being as good as others, 
how will one ever be as good as others?’ Mengzi (2001: 148), with some modifications to the translation. 
54 See Confucius (1971: 146). 
55 See Shun (1997: 23–24).
116 Confucian Virtue Jurisprudence
translated as perfect virtue, goodness, humaneness, or humanity. Ren in the broad sense is 
regarded as the unity of all the virtues including Ren in the narrow sense.
The broad sense of Ren was not elaborated on in the Analects, but we can char-
acterise Ren in the broad sense by examining more particular virtues such as filial-
ity. The virtue of filiality (or filial loyalty and respect, 孝) is regarded as the root of 
the development of Ren. In the Analects, we read at the opening of the text that, 
‘The Junzi applies himself to the roots. That being established, all practical courses 
naturally grow up. Filial piety and brotherly respect! – are they not the root of all 
benevolent actions?’56
Though Ren in the broad sense is an abstract notion concerned with interper-
sonal relations, the cultivation of Ren occurs within the family and with the people 
to whom we are most closely connected. So filiality is the preliminary form of Ren. 
An agent who fully extends the virtue of filiality to all social relations is a Ren 
agent. But extension of filiality to other social relationships is context-sensitive: the 
kind of respect that is due to members of one’s family will not be identical to the 
kind of respect that is due to a friend, co-worker, or official.
Another virtue involved in the development of the broad sense of Ren is cour-
age. Confucius once remarked that, ‘men possessing Ren are sure to be coura-
geous, but those who are courageous may not always be men possessing Ren.’57 
Joining filiality and courage are several other virtues that are united in the broad 
sense of Ren: these particular virtues are reverence, respectfulness, loyalty,58 toler-
ance, trustworthiness, quickness and generosity.59
The general notion of Ren represents the highest human achievement in ethical 
self-cultivation, hence the common translation as humanity. In addition, Ren 
involves action conforming to social norms and therefore Ren constrains action on 
the basis of unrestricted desires and impulses:
Yan Hui asked about Ren. The Master said, ‘Restraining yourself and returning to Li 
constitutes Ren. If for one day you managed to restrain yourself and return to Li, in this 
way you could lead the entire world back to Ren.’60
Human beings have natural desires and impulses, but given the social nature of 
human beings the expression of these desires can and should be regulated by Li. 
Ren is the virtue that endows ‘these feelings, impulses, and desires with a signifi-
56 Confucius (1971: 139), with some modifications to the translation. 
57 ibid 276, with some modifications to the translation.
58 Fan Chi asked about Ren. The Master said, ‘While at home hold yourself  in a respectful attitude; 
when serving in an official capacity be reverent; when dealing with others be loyal. These are qualities 
that cannot be put aside, even when you go and live among the barbarians.’ Confucius (1979: 121).
59 Zizhang asked Confucius about Ren. Confucius said, ‘There are five things and whoever is capable 
of  putting them into practice in the world is certainly Ren.’ When asked for details, he went on, ‘They are 
respectfulness, tolerance, trustworthiness, quickness, and generosity. If  a man is respectful he will not be 
treated with insolence. If  he is tolerant he will win the multitude. If  he is trustworthy in word his fellow 
men will entrust him with responsibility. If  he is quick he will achieve results. If  he is generous, he will be 
good enough to be put in a position over his fellow men.’ Confucius (1979: 144), with some modifications 
to the translation. 
60 Confucius (2001: 32), with some modifications to the translation. 
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cance beyond their de facto character’.61 The general notion of Ren was articulated 
by Cua as ‘moral life at its best’ and the ‘thematic unity of Confucian discourse’.62 
Although these characterisations of Ren are very abstract, they point to the unify-
ing character of Ren: particular virtues are unified by and constitutive of the gen-
eral virtue of Ren.
The narrow sense of Ren mainly concerns empathetic affections in the ethical 
life. It is illustrated in Mencius’ claim that ‘[t]he heart of compassion is 
benevolence.’63 Confucius’ thin definition of this narrow sense of Ren is loving 
people.64 However, in Confucius’ understanding of Ren, there might be two 
aspects expressed in two formulas, related to Ren as the practice of loving or car-
ing for persons. The positive formula is as follows:
Desiring to take his stand, one who is Ren helps others to take their stand; wanting to 
realize himself, he helps others to realize themselves. 65
And the passive formula is this: ‘Do not impose upon others what you yourself do 
not desire.’66
These formulas emphasise the empathetic nature of Ren. The two formulas 
require the virtuous agent to examine the impact of her decisions from the per-
spective of the persons who are affected by her actions. However, since Ren is 
supposed to be a virtue,67 these formulas should be understood as a requirement 
of empathy (as a disposition of character) rather than a requirement that agents 
engage in a particular procedure of practical reasoning: hence, Ren differs from 
Kant’s notion of the categorical imperative understood as a decision procedure 
for ethics.
On Mencius’ account, each virtue is connected with an emotion. According to 
Mencius, the emotion connected with Ren is sympathy or compassion; his account 
of the connection is based on his conception of human nature. Mencius argued for 
his positive conception via a thought experiment, which he described as follows:
The reason why I say that humans all have hearts that are not unfeeling toward others 
is this. Suppose someone suddenly saw a child about to fall into a well: everyone in such 
a situation would have a feeling of alarm and compassion – not because one sought to 
get in good with the child’s parents, not because one wanted fame among their neigh-
bors and friends, and not because one would dislike the sound of the child’s cries.68
Mencius’ thought experiment is designed to elicit the natural moral reactions of 
human beings towards the accident. The baby is going to fall into the well! It hap-
pens suddenly, and for this reason, it tests the gut reactions of human beings and 
61 Cua (1971: 132).
62 ibid 127.
63 Mengzi (2001: 143). 
64 See Confucius (1979: 116–17). 
65 Confucius (2001: 19), with some modifications to the translation.
66 ibid 42.
67 The contexts in which Ren is used in the Analects do imply that Ren is primarily a quality of  the agents.
68 Mengzi (2001: 129). 
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is designed to exclude the possibility of extended deliberation that might conceal 
the natural human reaction to the situation described in the thought experiment. 
Moreover, Mencius imposed several restrictions upon other possible relative fac-
tors that might motivate the observer’s reaction.
Using this thought experiment, Mencius argued that the natural emotional 
reaction of a human being is alarm and compassion. Seeing this intuitive sympa-
thetic reaction helps us to distil those human character traits that distinguish 
human beings from other animals. Mencius explicitly claimed, ‘From this we can 
see that if one is without the heart of compassion, one is not a human’. 69 He then 
connected this emotional reaction with the narrow sense of Ren: ‘The heart of 
compassion is the sprout of Ren.’70
For Mencius, human nature is characterised by the natural course of human 
ethical development:
In general, having these four sprouts within oneself, if one knows to fill them all out, it 
will be like a fire starting up, a spring breaking through! If one can merely fill them out, 
they will be sufficient to care for all within the Four Seas. If one merely fails to fill them 
out, they will be insufficient to serve one’s parents.71
Mencius’s claim in this paragraph is that given the proper circumstances and 
what he calls the four sprouts, human virtues will naturally begin to grow or emerge 
and subsequently will achieve completeness or full development.
In the case of the development of virtues, according to Mencius, human moral 
agents themselves create the natural circumstances for development. This is why 
he claimed, ‘To have these four sprouts but to say of oneself that one is unable to 
be virtuous is to steal from oneself’.72 The possession of the natural potential for 
virtue is sufficient to enable humans to acquire the virtues and hence to lead a 
virtuous life.73 This account can be characterised as a naturalistic developmental 
view of human nature. It is naturalistic, since good human nature is the normal 
expression of human nature, given the tendency of the development of particular 
species and the normal circumstances they live in. It is developmental, because it 
takes account of the process of the development instead of, say, stable functions of 
the complete or end state of the species.
This explanation of Mencius’ conception of human nature lays the ground for 
a better understanding of the relationship between the broad sense and the nar-
row sense of Ren. Since the narrow sense of Ren is the ethical capacity of sympathy 
or caring for others, it defines genuine human nature. While the broad sense of 
Ren concerns the whole unity of human excellences or the complete humanity, it 
could be seen as the highest ethical achievement of human beings. Then, we 
69 ibid. 
70 ibid 130, with some modifications to the translation.
71 Ibid. The ‘four sprouts’ here are the emotions that function as the foundation of  Mencius’ four 
virtues. They are compassion, shame, deference, approval and disapproval. 
72 ibid. 
73 Confucius has a similar remark. The Master said, ‘Is Ren really so far away? If  I merely desire Ren, 
I will find that Ren is already here.’ Confucius (2001: 22), with some modifications to the translation. 
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might claim that the broad sense of Ren is the final development of the narrow 
sense of Ren. 
III. A SKETCH OF A CONTEMPORARY CONFUCIAN  
VIRTUE JURISPRUDENCE
The task in this section is the application of Confucian thought in the context of 
modern legal theory. This section deals with the basic structure of Confucian legal 
theory.
A. Conceptual Clarification
When we turn to the Confucian legal theory, the enterprise of reconstructing 
Confucian views runs into a significant obstacle: the three great Confucian figures 
of antiquity did not articulate well-developed or elaborate theoretical views about 
law in the modern sense. The reason for their failure to pay theoretical attention 
to law may be connected to the fact that law in ancient China did not play the 
central role that it does in contemporary western societies.
The relatively minor role of law in ancient China has at least two aspects. First, 
Li governed most of the social conduct in the Pre-Qin dynasty that modern societ-
ies regulate through formal positive law. Second, laws were enacted by rulers in 
particular states (of which there were many within the territory that constituted 
the larger social, cultural and linguistic community), and the application of law 
was limited by the geographical boundaries of those states. By way of contrast, Li 
had universal application (within the relevant social world): thus Li constituted 
‘the common norms of the ancient world’ in ancient China.74
Given that Li was the dominant normative system in ancient China, our inquiry 
may be illuminated by a conceptual comparison between Li and law. But there is 
a potential confusion because of the linguistic dislocation of modern and ancient 
Chinese. The Chinese character Fa (法) is used as the parallel of law in translation 
between modern Chinese and English, but the ancient Chinese character Fa 
referred only to the rules governing punishment.75 So it is plausible to conclude 
that the main body of Fa in early Chinese history is limited as a subset of criminal 
law – essentially instructions to officials regarding criminal punishments.76
While Fa had a very limited scope, Li and modern positive law overlap to a 
significant degree. The first area of commonality occurs in those instances in which 
Li is codified and enacted by a political authority. Li (and not Fa) governed the 
basic political institutions and governmental procedures and hence the behaviour 
74 Chang (1990: 9). 
75 According to Shang Shu (《尚書》), an ancient script, ‘(these) five kinds of  punishment are called 
law’. Shang Shu: Lv Xin (《尚書·呂刑》).
76 Hansen (undated).
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of officials.77 Most contemporary legal theorists believe that for a norm to count as 
positive law it must be enacted or practised by officials. So some parts of Li share 
this crucial characteristic (governing official behaviour) with positive law. Li also 
included some norms or rules that would be classified as civil law in modern west-
ern legal systems. For example, marriage was regulated by Li. Sometimes, Li func-
tioned as an authoritative standard in dispute resolution.78 For these reasons, some 
historians claim that Li was actually the ancient Chinese equivalent of the modern 
concept of law.79
In sum, we are dealing with three conceptions, corresponding to the phrase 
positive law and the ancient Chinese words Fa and Li. Fa in ancient China referred 
only to the rules governing the imposition of punishment; these rules did not cre-
ate legal obligations for legal subjects. Li is a specific kind of social norm, includ-
ing propriety, ritual, custom, etiquette and both customary and positive law: even 
when Li was uncodified, it performed most of the social functions that law per-
forms in contemporary western cultures. That is, Li overlaps with the modern 
conception of positive law, but is not identical to it, encompassing some social 
norms that would not be classified as positive law on contemporary views of the 
nature of law. 
B. The End of Law
Confucian philosophers did not take Fa as their central concern, but they 
addressed the ancient practices that roughly correspond to modern positive law. 
The traditional view of Confucius’ attitude towards law is characterised in his 
injunction to ‘eliminate litigation’. The Master said, ‘In hearing litigations, I am 
as the others. The point is to eliminate litigation.’80 Is ‘eliminate litigation’ a strong 
claim about all possible circumstances or is it a moderate claim limited to ideal 
circumstances? We believe that the moderate version provides both the best his-
torical interpretation and the best contemporary reconstruction of the Confucian 
view.
Borrowing the distinction between first best and second best from economics 
illuminates our case for the moderate interpretation. Consider the first-best world 
of Confucian theory: in that world, the preconditions for an optimal harmonious 
Confucian society would be satisfied. These preconditions include the following: 
(1) each and every member of society would possess sufficient virtue; (2) the con-
tent of Li would have been framed by the Sage Kings – who themselves would be 
fully virtuous, possessing Ren and Yi; (3) Li would be properly observed by the 
members of society, including those aspects of Li that regulate or govern conduct 
77 See Li Ji: Wang Zhi (《禮記·王制》).
78 See Li Ji: Qu Li (《禮記 ·曲禮》).
79 See Mei (1975: 137).
80 See de Montesquieu (1981: 3).
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(apologies, voluntary restitution, etc) after social conflict (to the extent it is 
unavoidable) has occurred. If these conditions (and perhaps others) were satisfied, 
then we would have the first-best state of society: in this state, the best policy for 
judicial activity is to eliminate litigation, or if that is not possible, to constrain liti-
gation so that its occurrence is rare and exceptional.81
Suppose, however, that one of the preconditions for an optimal harmonious 
Confucian ideal society could not be fulfilled. For example, if some members of 
society do not possess the minimal amount of virtue required, then the public 
policy of ‘eliminate litigation’ may actually result in less harmony. Under these 
circumstances, some litigation should be encouraged to produce the best possible 
results given non-ideal conditions. Thus, we contend that the most reasonable 
interpretation of Confucius’ remark, ‘eliminate litigation’, construes his injunc-
tion as a description of the first-best state.
Confucius’ opinion about litigation leads us to our account of the ends of law. 
We begin with Li, because Li played an essential role in the social and political life 
of ancient Chinese. We read in the Analects that ‘[i]n practicing Li, harmony is to 
be prized’.82 This conception of harmony has two aspects: harmony of society and 
harmony of the individual.
The first aspect of harmony is the social coordinative function of Li. This func-
tion of Li is directed at the harmony of society; everyone has a proper position in 
the community regulated and guided by Li. We might call this aspect of harmony 
coordinative harmony. Given the similar coordinative functions of Li in the ancient 
world of China on the one hand, and of law83 in modern society on the other, we 
conclude that coordinative harmony is an important end of law. In modern soci-
ety, law creates a formal and relatively determinate guidance for social interaction 
as well as an ultimate standard of dispute resolution. In an ideal society, the dis-
pute-resolution function of law is displaced by the law’s action-guiding role.
The second aspect of the harmony-creating function of law is based on the 
premise that societies will function better if the rules of law are the object of vol-
untary compliance by individuals. Achieving voluntary compliance creates associ-
ated requirements for the inner dispositions possessed by the subjects of law. We 
might call this kind of harmony autonomous harmony. Autonomous harmony is 
related to the expressive function of Li. Individuals can express their emotions or 
exercise their virtues smoothly with the help of Li and follow their own sentiments 
and desires without creating a breach of Li. Since the natural tendency of moral 
development of human beings is defined by their affective and empathetic capa-
cities, Confucian thinkers believe that given the external proper social circum-
stances and the natural development of affective capacity without disruption, 
humans can experience an inner harmony between their emotional state and the 
requirements of virtue.
81 For a more complete account of  the role of  litigation, see Solum (2004: 181, 186–89).
82 Confucius (1971: 143), with some modifications to the translation.
83 Raz provides us with an insightful modern perspective of  the coordination value of  law. See Raz 
(1986: 57–62).
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Our notion of autonomous harmony depends on the constituent notion of 
autonomy. For our purposes, autonomy can be defined abstractly; Gerald Dworkin 
defines autonomy as ‘a second-order capacity of persons to reflect critically upon 
their first-order preferences, desires, wishes, and so forth and the capacity to 
accept or attempt to change these in light of higher-order preferences and val-
ues’.84 With this abstract concept of autonomy in mind, we can see how autono-
mous harmony works. Although the virtue of Ren is based on natural intuitive 
emotional reactions, possession of this virtue enables self-cultivating agents to, 
first, reflect on the natural de facto feelings, desires and impulses and, secondly, to 
reshape their behaviour without external direction. This satisfies the two elements 
required by the general concept of autonomy proposed by Gerald Dworkin: 
(1) the ability to perform, based on higher-order evaluation, critical reflection and 
(2) the freedom to lead a good life without direction from others.
Ren (or virtues) and Li (or social norms) are mutually supportive. In the context 
of traditional Chinese society, the relationship between internal dispositions and 
external norms is harmonised by the expressive function of Li. Because Li 
embraced the highly uniform cultural values of ancient Chinese society, members 
of that society could successfully express their virtues autonomously. The autono-
mous harmony between conduct rules Li and internal virtues Ren could be 
archived by the fully virtuous Junzi. This harmonious state is conveyed in 
Confucius’ remark on his own experiences of self-cultivation: at 70, he could fol-
low what his heart desired without disobeying the rules.85
But in modern societies, this might not be the case. On the one hand, there are 
differing and sometimes inconsistent values in modern societies characterised by 
value pluralism. On the other hand, law in modern society regulates behaviour 
rather than mental states, but virtue is constituted by inner dispositions. Law 
might have some expressive function, even if there might be an overlap in the 
content of law and the deeply held conventional norms in a given society, but the 
expressive function of law is quite limited given the fact of value pluralism.
Given these two factors, autonomous harmony cannot be fully achieved under 
contemporary conditions in the same way that Confucian thinkers believed it 
could in ancient China. For this reason, the development of contemporary 
Confucian virtue jurisprudence requires us to re-examine the relationship 
between law and virtue. When an agent performs actions in accord with external 
norms, she is fully autonomous if and only if she has critically reflected upon the 
norms and decided for herself to abide by the norms without any coercion, decep-
tion, or other forms of autonomy-nullifying interference. However, since humans 
have the potential to become fully virtuous, law can play a formative role that is 
consistent with autonomy during the process of moral development. During the 
time when an agent is developing the capacity to reflect on her own values, she 
must follow conduct rules which have not yet been thoroughly reflected upon and 
84 Dworkin (1988: 20).
85 See Confucius (2001: 5).
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endorsed autonomously. Absent such rules, the developing moral agent might 
injure others or invade their rights or act in ways that destroy her own capacity 
for critical self-reflection. The development of both virtue and autonomy is 
enabled by the developmental exercises that involve actions guided by the rules. 
Rules are necessary in the process of self-cultivation and habituation that enables 
individuals to develop the capacities and dispositions that constitute virtue and 
enable autonomy.
Autonomous harmony can be achieved by observing two moderate require-
ments for the content of law. The first requirement is that the range of legally 
permissible and legally required conduct should (a) permit a sufficient range of 
virtuous conduct and (b) not require vicious conduct. This requirement ensures 
that people can develop their natural capacities and maintain autonomy without 
violating the law. On the one hand, virtuous humans would then be enabled to 
lead virtuous lives according to their own conception of human flourishing with-
out being subjected to compulsory interference. On the other hand, persons who 
do not possess the full measure of virtue are not forced to act in accord with values 
that they have not chosen autonomously.
The second requirement is that law should create conditions that can facilitate 
individuals in the development of virtue without offending the rights of others. In 
some situations, law may be able to create conditions that can gradually change 
people’s moral preference. One of the well-known examples in the Anglo-
American tradition is provided by good Samaritan laws. The concrete content of 
good Samaritan laws varies from one jurisdiction to another, but the basic idea is 
that law exempts rescuers from certain kinds of legal liability and hence encour-
ages rescue. To the extent that citizens learn the content and purposes of the law, 
laws of this kind can alter the moral preference of legal actors and help them in 
the development of virtues (and therefore, in Confucian terms, Ren).
In sum, the highest value of Confucian ethical, political theory is the harmony 
of society and individual. At the social dimension, we have coordinative harmony, 
which is related to the coordinative function of Li. At the individual dimension, 
we have autonomous harmony, which is connected with the expressive function of Li. 
Because Li and law do not share the function of expression of dispositions and 
emotions, our claim is that law’s ability to foster ‘autonomous harmony’ is limited 
in scope: whereas Li can play a pervasive role in shaping values and virtues, the 
educative and developmental function of law is restricted. Of course, law can 
indirectly create the conditions for the development of autonomous harmony in 
other ways – by enabling, supporting and protecting the institutions that directly 
engage in moral education and development – primarily the family, schools and 
other institutions (such as religious institutions or voluntary social associations).86
86 See also Clark (2012).
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C. Names and Confucian Theories of Legislation and Adjudication
Given coordinative harmony and autonomous harmony as ends of law, we need 
to provide an account of how the legal norms are internalised by legal actors. The 
Confucian doctrine of correcting names might give us an explanation of the 
mechanism of internalisation in terms of the relationship among social norms, law 
and names. Given the end of law as the coordination of social interactions and 
harmonious autonomy, we claim that there are important normative require-
ments regarding the usage of names in legislative and judicial proceedings.
We have already seen that names (thick ethical concepts) provide guidance for 
actions. Regicide and cruelty were provided as examples in our introduction of the 
doctrine of correcting names above. But regicide is thinner than cruel. The applica-
tion of regicide requires a deep and complex evaluation of whether the person 
claiming to be a lord is virtuous and whether he fulfils the political obligations 
attached to his political role.87 But in the case of cruel, we frequently do not need to 
engage in deep and complex evaluations prior to the application of the concept. 
Usually, we are able to see cruelty: we are able to perceive cruelty in the situation. 
In the case of regicide, more than perception is required. For this reason, we believe 
that regicide is thinner than cruel. Our view of the doctrine of correcting names 
explicitly adopts the idea that what we call the thickness of ethical concepts is scalar 
– although the scale may be coarse-grained rather than continuous.
We have already discussed the fact that in ancient Chinese society, Li was the 
basic normative system ‘involving rite, ceremony, manners or general deportment 
that bind human beings and the spirit together in networks of interacting roles’.88 
Social interactions were coordinated by Li and an individual’s virtues were 
expressed with the help of Li. But it seems plausible that both Li and names (thick 
ethical concepts) perform an action-guiding function. This common function 
leads naturally to the next question: what is the relationship between Li and 
names? There are two perspectives on this question.
From the first perspective, some thick ethical concepts in a given community 
are dependent on the normative system of that community. Consider regicide. The 
proper application of this term requires evaluation of the actions performed and 
character traits possessed by the political leader. In other words, the true ethical 
meaning of this name, as Mencius recovered it, makes reference to the normative 
requirement for the role of lord as specified by Li, the normative system of the 
community.
From the second perspective, however, it turns out that stable linguistic prac-
tice of thicker names is one of the necessary conditions for the action-guiding 
87 These two kinds of  evaluation are normally connected with each other since many political norms 
binding the ruler or subjects are so called v-rules. V-rules in ancient political morality can be expressed 
like this: Given a political virtue X, the v-rule related to this virtue is ‘perform actions in accordance with 
what an X agent would characteristically do in the circumstances’. A sophisticated discussion of  V-rules 
can be found in Hursthouse (1999: 26–42).
88 Schwartz (1985: 67).
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function of a normative system. Consider cruel. The proper application of cruel can 
(in normal circumstances, if not all circumstances) be accomplished without delib-
eration about or reliance on related social norms. But cruel plays a role in the sys-
tem of norms. One can imagine a case in which the proper application of regicide 
would depend on whether someone was not properly described as a lord because 
of systematic acts of cruelty. Hence, the system of norms that provides the condi-
tions for the correct application of the thinner name regicide includes thicker names 
such as cruelty.
These two perspectives on the relationship between Li and names suggest that 
there might be a multi-layered structure concerning the thickness of the Confucian 
names. Thicker names like cruel or courageous are in the lower layers, layers that are 
tightly entangled with the non-ethical qualities of the world. Thinner names like 
regicide or thief, whose application may involve moral norms or other thicker 
names, are in the upper layers89 – where the entanglement of fact with value is 
mediated by the system of social norms. Due to their thinness, the layer of thinner 
names is tied more closely to Li. Expressed from a different angle, the world-
guidedness of thinner names is dependent on the normative system of particular 
communities.
This brings us to the relationship between thick ethical terms and legal terms. 
Williams discusses thick terms that are ethical, but for our discussion there is no 
reason to stick to this moral sense. We call the general notion thick evaluative concepts 
(or simply names) and the legal notion thick legal concepts (or legal names).
The paradigm cases of thick legal concepts, in Xunzi’s discussion, are the 
names for punishments. In the contemporary legal context, the categories of dif-
ferent crimes provide good examples of legal names; these include robbery, theft, 
murder, rape, and so on.90 On the one hand, we have legal names like robbery or 
murder, which have a technical meaning in the legal context, but on the other 
hand, we use robbery or murder in the sense of general evaluative thick ethical con-
cepts in our ordinary moral discourse. To avoid ambiguity, we might call the 
moral notion thick extralegal concepts and the legal notion thick legal concepts.91
Given that law is a normative system, the most fundamental function of law 
should be action guiding. What role do thick legal concepts play in law’s action-
guiding function? To answer this question, we need an account of the action-
guidance function of law in general. We begin by observing that there are two 
89 Williams was criticised by Samuel Scheffler on the ground that he did not give us a well-defined 
notion of  thick ethical concepts. Scheffler is worried that some concepts, such as ‘justice’ and ‘equality’, 
might not be confidently classified as either thick or thin concepts. See Scheffler (1987: 417).
In our interpretation of  Confucian names, they can be located on the upper levels. Since they are 
at the very top level and hence lose most of  the world-guidedness character, they might be viewed as 
thin ethical terms as well. Concepts of  this sort cannot be classified as thicker or thinner according to 
their relation to norms. 
90 Antony Duff, in his discussion on the relationship between thick legal concepts and thick extralegal 
concepts, took the various kinds of  crime as examples of  thick concepts involved in the law. See Duff  
(2001: 191).
91 ibid.
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patterns for the action-guiding role of law: following Shapiro, we will call the first 
pattern epistemic guidance and the second pattern motivational guidance. 92
The first pattern is epistemic guidance. To ensure that legal rules actually guide 
behaviour, individuals must know what is required by law. In the mode of epis-
temic guidance, legal subjects learn what is required by legal rule and perform 
actions required by law because of their knowledge of the rule. Their motives may 
or may not involve the aim of complying with the law; for example, knowledge of 
the law plus fear of punishment might produce compliance by agents who have 
no regard for the law itself.
The second pattern is motivational guidance, which can be seen as a subset of 
epistemic guidance. In the pattern of motivational guidance, legal subjects are 
successfully motivated by the legal content to actually perform law-abiding 
actions. For example, if an agent were moved by a desire to comply with the law, 
we would have a clear case of motivational guidance.
How do thick legal concepts contribute to the guidance function of law? First, 
consider the epistemic guidance role of rules and thick legal concepts. Suppose 
that a legal rule R employs a thick legal concept T to describe one of the essential 
premises for the application of that rule and/or the attribution of certain legal 
consequences. By incorporating a thick concept in that rule, legislators and judges 
could regulate a specific type of behaviour that might not be accomplished by 
employing merely descriptive concepts. Legal rules are designed to reflect practi-
cal concerns or interests. Thick concepts are perfectly suited to the task of formu-
lating rules that capture these concerns and interests. The scope of the application 
of thick concepts is limited by the concerns or interests behind them and thus can 
precisely express the intention of legislators or judges. In this scenario, we might 
say that fraud is not just illegal and deceitful but it is illegal in the light of its deceitful-
ness. A citizen who grasps fraud would grasp the content of a legal rule using that 
term and understand which actions are within the scope of the rule.
Thick legal concepts also have motivational value for those who embrace them. 
For instance, if someone fully embraces the concept of cruelty and describes an 
action as cruel, she has a reason not to do that action. Suppose that a legal rule 
forbids parents from inflicting cruel punishment on their children and a particular 
parent fully embraces the concept of cruel, then that parent will be motivated to 
refrain from punishing her child in a cruel way.
Now consider the relationship between thick legal concepts and their raw form 
– thick extralegal concepts in ordinary moral or normative language. Some of the 
categories of crimes are the representatives of thick legal concepts, such as rob-
bery, theft, murder and rape. On the one hand, we have thick legal concepts like 
robbery or murder, which have a technical legal meaning, but on the other, we 
use thick extralegal concepts like robbery or murder in our ordinary moral dis-
course. The fact that thick terms can have this dual role leads to the well-known 
92 See Shapiro (1998: 490). We will return to this point and have a more extended discussion in the 
next section.
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phenomenon of the same word having two different senses – a technical legal 
sense (the thick legal concept) in which the full content of the concept is specified 
by a system of legal norms and an ordinary sense (the thick extralegal concept) in 
which the content is based on the system of social norms. The two senses of the 
concept and the two systems of norms may interact with each other in complex 
ways – with the law both shaping and responding to the social norm system. Does 
the content of a thick extralegal concept in some way determine, shape, or con-
strain the content of a thick legal concept that shares the same name (eg ‘murder’ 
in ordinary discourse and ‘murder’ in the technical legal sense)?
One way to answer this question is to imagine an acoustic separation (as Dan-
Cohen has famously done in his account of conduct rules and decision rules)93 
between thick extralegal concepts understood by general citizens and thick legal 
concepts understood by legal experts. We can imagine that a society is divided 
into two separate discourse groups: in one discourse group we would have the 
general citizens and in the other group we would have legal experts, lawyers and 
legal officials. Suppose these two groups are acoustically separate from each other 
and they have the same legal text. And, let us further suppose that these two 
groups’ understanding of the extensions of thick concepts does not have substan-
tial overlap. If the law is to fulfil its crucial epistemic action-guiding function, the 
thick legal concepts and their extralegal versions have to share a similar norma-
tive shape.
Another argument in support of this conclusion is based on the motivational 
role of thick normative concepts. Thick concepts can reinforce the motivational 
force of law only when there is an overlap between the legal meaning of the con-
cept and the ordinary meaning which is shaped by the values embedded in a 
specific cultural community conveyed through daily linguistic practice. If the legal 
technical meaning of thick ethical concepts becomes totally disconnected with 
their ordinary meaning, a linguistic barrier will be built between the legal elites 
and the lay citizens and the law will be in danger of losing its motivational power. 
From the perspective of ordinary citizens, the law will no longer make normative 
sense – the disconnected legal concept will seem arbitrary or unreasonable.
Confucian virtue jurisprudence holds that for law to guide conduct optimally, it 
must be capable of being internalised and thereby capable of generating motives 
for conformity by legal subjects. The correct use of names can help citizens to 
internalise legal norms and become naturally motivated to obey the law. 
Moreover, convergence between thick legal concepts and thick ethical concepts 
enables law to produce both coordinative harmony and autonomous harmony. 
Thus, the doctrine of correcting names explains how internalisation occurs and, 
at the same time, prescribes a normative requirement for the use of thick ethical 
concepts in legislation and by the judiciary.
93 See Dan-Cohen (1984: 630–34).
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D. The Nature of Law
Some scholars have argued that Confucian theory of law, as it was developed in 
the classical literature without any further articulation, can be seen as a Chinese 
version of natural law,94 while others ascribe to it a Dworkinian coherentist read-
ing.95 In this part of the essay, we address these arguments and take a step towards 
the development of a theory of the nature of law. 
Informally, we might say that legal positivism claims that the question of 
whether a given rule is law can only be answered by consulting things like statute 
books, court decisions and patterns of behaviour by officials, whereas natural law 
theory asserts that the justice (or injustice) of a rule factors into the answer to that 
question.96 More technically, contemporary legal positivism asserts that it is neces-
sarily the case that legal content is determined by social facts. Exclusive legal pos-
itivism claims that only social facts determine legal content, while inclusive legal 
positivism allows that moral facts may determine legal content, but only if social 
facts establish this role for moral facts.97 Natural law theory, on the other hand, 
claims that moral facts necessarily determine legal content.
Now consider our Confucian account of the nature of law. Our theory is both 
a positive as well as a normative theory of law. As a positive theory, it describes 
and explains how law functions in the society; as a normative theory of law, it sets 
up normative standards for the content of law and legal practice. Our positive 
theory is an explanatory functional conception of law, rather than a direct answer 
to the metaphysical or conceptual question ‘What is law?’ That is, in this essay, 
we adopt an agnostic stance on the debate between natural lawyers and legal 
positivists.
As we have seen earlier, Confucius believed that pre-Qin ancient Chinese law 
(Fa) could not serve as a normative system sufficient to provide guidance for 
actions; instead, he contended that only Li (social norms already internalised by 
community members) could fulfil this function. As we have discussed in last sec-
tion, the action-guiding function of law is also the central theme in contemporary 
western analytic jurisprudence. A good place to start with is Hart’s conceptual 
analysis of law. Hart took the guidance function as one of the basic functions that 
law serves.98 
94 See Needham (1956: 544). See also Greer and Lim (1998: 80–89).
95 See Peerenboom (1990:12–39).
96 See Hart (1994). We choose Hart’s theory of  law as a point of  comparison for two reasons. First, 
Hart’s work is key to the evolution of  modern positivist theory, representing the bridge between the 
positivism of  Bentham and Austin and contemporary analytic positivism. Second, Hart’s theory is the 
best-known version of  contemporary positivism among legal theorists generally. Other important forms 
of  legal positivism include those developed in the work of  Coleman (2001); Kelsen (1945); Raz (1979); 
and Shapiro (2000: 127–70).
97 Inclusive legal positivism accepts the view that legal contents and moral facts can be indirectly con-
nected with each other.
98 Hart writes (1994: 249): ‘In fact I think it quite vain to seek any more specific purpose which law as 
such serves beyond providing guides to human conduct and standard of  criticism of  such conduct.’ 
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The primary aim of Hart’s theory is a conceptual account of the nature of law, 
and hence an account of what counts as law and what does not. In this regard, 
this guidance function is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a normative 
system to qualify as a legal system. Hart added that this guidance function ‘will 
not of course serve to distinguish laws from other rules or principles with same 
general aims’ and ‘the distinctive features of law are the provision it makes by 
secondary rules for the identification, change, and enforcement of its standards 
and the general claim it makes to priority over other standards.’99 So, Hart’s posi-
tivist account of the nature of law has two elements. The first is a second-order 
binding rule (a rule of recognition) that is applied by legal officials, including 
judges, administrative officials and legislators, as a standard of validity of law. The 
second element is acceptance by most individuals of the first-order rules (primary 
rules) validated by the rule of recognition. These two elements give rise to onto-
logical criteria for the existence of a legal system in a given community. In a legal 
system, according to Hart, the binding second-order rule of recognition is a fun-
damental social norm, but valid first-order rules are not necessarily social norms 
because their validity is derived from the rule of recognition. What kind of guid-
ance function, associated with the fundamental social norm and the rules that are 
derived from it, is involved here? Hart’s answer to this question rested on his 
notion of internal point of view. An internal point of view is an evaluative perspec-
tive adopted by community members from which they see rules of law as their 
own reasons for actions and criticise others’ behaviour when others disobey the 
law.100
By incorporating the idea of internal perspective, Hart presented two ontologi-
cal standards for the existence of a rule: (1) a standard of the state of mind (inter-
nal point of view) and (2) a standard of behaviour (stable pattern of behaviour). 
According to this ontological standard, a rule exists in a community if and only if 
the relevant actors in that community take this rule as a reason for their action 
and their behaviour actually fits the pattern that is prescribed by that rule. By 
reading Hart in functionalist terms, Shapiro showed that there might be two pat-
terns of rule guidance with regard to secondary social norms and primary con-
duct rules.101 Shapiro distinguished motivational guidance from epistemic 
guidance – along the lines we discussed above. On Shapiro’s interpretation of 
Hart’s account of legal guidance, lay citizens need not be motivationally guided 
by the content of law in order to obey the law, because epistemic guidance is 
sufficient.
Confucian virtue jurisprudence gives emphasis to the motivational process 
when legal subjects are guided by the law. Based on the distinction between 
epistemic and motivational guidance, we can articulate the general motivating 
process in legal domains like this:
99 ibid.
100 ibid 55–57.
101 See Shapiro (1998: 490).
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A legal subject S will perform rule-governed action A if and only if she learns that it 
would be required by rule R (epistemic judgement) and she is motivated by motiva-
tional factors Fs, which possibly (but not necessarily) include normative judgements and 
emotional reactions.
Thus, our theory takes a normative stance on the legal subjects’ motives in law’s 
guidance process. In a well-functioning rule-of-law society, according to 
Confucian thinkers, a sufficient number of citizens possess the virtue Yi. These 
virtuous citizens perform law-governed actions for the right reasons and with the 
right motivational attitudes; shame plays a crucial role in their motivational atti-
tudes. Shame can be divided into two subcategories, conventional shame and 
ethical shame. A person with a sense of conventional shame only conforms to the 
rules because she is afraid of the social pressure generated by rule-breaking behav-
iour and not because she really thinks it is wrong to break that rule. Someone with 
a sense of ethical shame (or possessing the virtue of Yi) abides by the rule because 
she thinks it is wrong to break the rule. For these people, the feeling of shame is 
raised from their own reflection on what they have done with regard to what kind 
of person they expect themselves to be. 
Using Hart’s terminology, the Confucian notion of an attitude towards rules 
that incorporates ethical shame as a focal motivation can be seen as a strong ver-
sion of internal point of view. It is not clear, however, whether Hart would accept 
this Confucian account of the internal point of view. Hart explicitly claims that 
understanding his conception of internal point of view as internal feelings of 
compulsion or being bound and the externally observable physical behaviour is a 
misrepresentation of his account.102 Translating Hart’s claim into Confucian lan-
guage, it seems conventional shame cannot be a necessary part of the internal 
aspect of rules. Later on, Hart acknowledges that the internal point of view may 
display itself in self-criticism,103 but in legal contexts this self-criticism is not neces-
sarily connected with a sense of shame because Hart classifies rules that give rise 
to shame when disobeyed as moral rules.104 So, Hart does not seem to endorse the 
strong Confucian claim that a well-functioning social order requires that subjects 
of the law must take this strong version of internal point of view towards legal 
rules. As we have discussed earlier, this strong version of internal point of view is 
at the centre of our Confucian theory of law. 
This view of the internal aspect of law can be generalised as what we have 
called the Internalisation Thesis. In the original context, Confucius’ internalisation 
thesis concerns Li, which is situated between morality and positive law (as those 
notions are understood in contemporary legal theory). Let’s recall what Confucius 
has said:
The Master said, ‘If the people be led by governmental regulations, and uniformity 
sought to be given them by punishments, they will try to avoid the punishment, but 
102 Hart (1994: 57).
103 ibid.
104 ibid 86.
Linghao Wang and Lawrence B Solum 131
have no sense of shame. If they be led by virtue, and uniformity sought to be given them 
by Li, they will have the sense of shame, and moreover will reform themselves.’105
This leads to a possible objection to our account of the internalisation thesis: mod-
ern law (or positive law) does not necessarily share this expressive function with 
ancient Li. By definition, the content of Li is internalised by social members. In 
the case of positive law in modern societies, however, the content of legal norms is 
frequently not internalised (or in some cases even known) by citizens.
This possible objection is illuminated by considering the Confucian attitude 
towards positive law. That attitude is based on the premise that a normative sys-
tem, be it morality, social norms or positive law, functions well if and only if it is 
able to guide the behaviour of citizens. Confucian theory assigns the emotions of 
the subjects of the law a central role in determining the ability of norms to guide 
action. For Confucian virtue jurisprudence, in a well-functioning rule-of-law soci-
ety most legal subjects must be motivated in the following way when they perform 
law-governed actions:
A legal subject S performs law governed action A if she learns that it would be required 
by legal rule R (epistemic judgement) and she is motivated by motivational factors Fs, 
which includes normative judgements and emotional reactions.
Since we have already shown the value of thick legal concepts in legal contexts, 
the normative judgement here could either be an intuitive, thick judgement (with the 
help of thick concepts) or an reflective, overall judgement (about the all-things-
considered rightness or wrongness of an action). The presumption under this for-
mulation of law-guided action is that the epistemic apprehension of a legal 
requirement cannot guarantee the motivational state. For Confucius, in a well-
functioning society, legal actors’ motivational states and their knowledge of law 
should be in a harmonious relationship. If the content of a legal rule is fully under-
stood by a legal actor with a proper motivational state in place, then we would say 
that this rule is internalised by that legal actor.
Since we are dealing with a Confucian account of the nature of law, a question 
naturally arises as to what kind of law can be internalised by virtuous legal sub-
jects. Before we answer this question directly, consider a dialogue in the Analects:
The Duke of She told Confucius. ‘There is an upright man among my people. His 
father stole a sheep, and he testified against him.’ 
Confucius replied, ‘Among my people, those we consider “upright” are different 
from this: fathers cover up for their sons, and sons cover up for their fathers. This is 
what it means to be “upright.”’106
At first glance, the issue concerned in this dialogue has the character of a moral 
dilemma. Testifying against a criminal is a civic duty required by political moral-
ity, but the crime to be reported is performed by one’s father. The virtue of filial 
105 Confucius (1971: 146), with some modifications to the translation.
106 Confucius (2001: 36), with some modifications to the translation. 
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piety and the rules in Li require that one should love one’s father and thus should 
cover up this crime to protect him from serious punishment. Confucius’ resolu-
tion of the dilemma seems to suggest that in this specific circumstance, the virtu-
ous agent should not report the crime. Given Confucius’ particularism, his 
resolution should not be interpreted as a universal claim about all cases that share 
the basic structure described in the dialogue.107
The reason for Confucius’ resolution of the dilemma is not clear in the dia-
logue.108 Our interpretation is that the strong emotions of love and affection that 
a good son has towards his father override the civic duty to report a trivial case of 
theft. One of the basic presumptions of Confucian virtue ethics lies in its role-
based character, so moral requirements differ according to the roles an agent 
possesses in her ethical relations. Because the son is in this special relation to his 
father, he should care more deeply for his father than should ordinary community 
members.
What then is the implication of this dialogue? Suppose that in the state where 
this dialogue happened, there was a general legal rule that requires citizens to 
report every crime, including crimes committed by one’s close family members. 
From a Confucian point of view, this rule should neither have been enacted nor 
be enforced, because the rule goes against the natural sentiments of legal subjects 
and thus could not be fully internalised by virtuous actors.
This claim can be seen as a normative account of the content of law. As char-
acterised from a Confucian perspective, we can make a normative claim about 
the content of law based on the internalisation thesis:
The content of law should be such that the law can be internalised by legal actors to the 
extent required for law to perform its essential function of action guidance. 
Two further points clarify this claim. First, this claim about the content of law 
should be restricted to those legal rules that have morally significant content. 
Rules concerning purely coordination or the efficiency of social interactions have 
nothing to do with this internalisation thesis; and technical rules which are not 
directly related to the citizen’s ordinary life are excluded as well. In this regard, 
there is no requirement of the capability of internalisation for the content of regu-
lations requiring all traffic to keep either to the left or the right side of the road or 
for legal rules governing the use of the radio spectrum.
Second, intuitive emotional reactions are essential elements of social norms (Li), 
but social norms also reinforce or weaken emotional reactions. In a society like 
that of ancient China, which highly values family relations, one’s intuitive emo-
tional reaction of filial piety might be stronger than that in modern societies. If 
107 eg consequence matters here. Let’s imagine that his father has conducted a crime of  manslaughter, 
then what would Confucius say about this? We do not know, but Confucius would probably not suggest 
that the son cover up the father’s crime in this case.
108 Some commentators provide us with a nepotistic, as well as consequentialist, reading. They 
suggest that Confucius saw filial piety as the foundation of  the development of  any other virtues, or, fam-
ily relation as the most fundamental social relation for human beings, without which the society will 
collapse. See Chen (1990: 925). 
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this is the case, then social norms and law do share some content with regard to 
the very deep moral intuitions of human beings, but that content might be slightly 
different depending on the fundamental values embedded in different communi-
ties’ social norms. Take the mutual concealment of father and son as an example. 
Similar principles of the concealment between close family members are found in 
several legal cultures, be it modern or ancient, east or west. But the specific con-
tent of this principle in a legal culture varies depending on the fundamental values 
embedded in the social norms in that culture.
This brings us back to the relationship of Confucian virtue jurisprudence to 
legal positivism and natural law theory. Because our theory offers a normative 
and functionalist account of law, its relationship to contemporary debates over 
the nature of law is oblique. Our theory does not take a direct stand on the ques-
tion of whether social facts (or moral facts) determine legal content. So it seems, 
on the surface at least, that Confucian virtue jurisprudence might be consistent 
with either natural law or legal positivism.
At this point, a legal positivist might offer the following objection. Our theory 
seems to require a substantial overlap between thick legal concepts and thick 
moral concepts. So the legal concept of cruelty would have to have substantially 
the same content as the thick moral concepts. This might seem to lead to the con-
clusion that legal content is determined by moral facts, but legal positivists deny 
that this can be the case – while natural lawyers affirm that it must be.
But this objection would be based on a misunderstanding of our theory. We do 
not claim that thick legal concepts must substantially overlap with thick ethical 
concepts as a matter of legal ontology. That is, we are not claiming that a thick 
legal concept like cruelty would not be positive law if it were detached from the 
thick ethical concept whose name it shares. Our claim is simply that detachment 
would prevent the legal concept from guiding behaviour in the way that it should.
This point about the limited nature of our claim becomes clear in the extreme 
case of detachment – acoustic separation. Suppose that the system of adjudication 
were to employ a legal concept of cruelty that was radically different than the 
ordinary moral concept – and that ordinary citizens were completely unaware of 
the technical legal notion of cruelty. In those circumstances, the legal concept 
could still be called law, because it would provide the standard for authoritative 
legal resolution of disputes, but the legal concept could not properly fulfil the 
action-guiding function of law, since citizens would be unaware (or only partially 
aware) of the technical legal concept.
IV. CONCLUSION
We have offered a sketch of Confucian virtue jurisprudence, a distinctive position 
in the general theory of law that has its ancient roots in classical Confucian 
thought in China. We interpreted Confucian ethical and social thought as a 
version of virtue ethics. That interpretation served as the basis for developing a 
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contemporary legal theory. The core of our theory is our account of law’s proper 
function, which we can summarise as the creation of a social order on the basis of 
coordinative harmony and autonomous harmony. That is, we believe that the 
aim of law is to provide a social order that rests on norms that can be internalised 
by autonomous agents who possess certain virtues. In other words, our view of 
law reconciles individual freedom and social order via the fundamental Confucian 
notion of harmony.
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